Tuskegee airmen 


From a friend, have not verified this information myself: 


The George Lucas film, "Red Tails", about the Tuskegee airmen, will be released in January. This might be a good time to revisit the facts as stated a few years ago. 



From: Bob Powell 



Date: July 3, 2008 

This letter was not written for publication, but to enlighten you and you and your staff about some of the errors and misleading 

information you continue to publish, Perhaps it should be published  to set your readers straight. 



As a WWII Historian and former 8th AF fighter pilot flying 87 missions over Europe during WWII, I am dedicated to factual reporting 

about the air war in Europe and aviation in general, and I take issue  with the media (and not with just AJC) continuing to publish untrue 

and/or misleading statements about the Tuskegee Airmen (T/A). Although I have great respect for the pilots and achievements of this 

WWII Fighter Group, I do not appreciate the continuing repetition of myths and untruths about their military record, the latest example in 

the obit on Lt. Col Charles Dryden in today's paper, repeating the same errors which appeared in his obit story a few days ago.. 



For more than 60 years the myth that they " never lost a bomber they were escorting to an enemy fighter ", was their primary claim to fame! 

Then, several months ago, their Historian , William E. Holten, announced that his research proved that this was not true, that they 

had, indeed, lost some 25 bombers to enemy fighters. This myth still gets published occasionally, but far less frequently since he made 

this disclosure, thank goodness. Lies told often enough tend to bemome truths in the minds of many. However, it now seems to have 

been replaced by another false claim, i.e. that the Tuskegee Airmen flew more than 15,000 combat missions. ALSO NOT TRUE! 


Their own official records indicate that the T/A only flew 311missions. Their so-called 15,000 "missions" were actually 15,000 

"sorties.". Apparently, none of your reporters know the difference between a "mission" and a "sortie," so let me define these for you 

and them. Combat Mission is an assigned flight to accomplish a military objective. This can be flown by one pilot or a squadron or 

group of pilots flying together. It is recorded as one mission. Combat Sortie. When, for example, 48 or 64 pilots fly together on a 

combat mission it is recorded as 48 or 64 combat sorties. 

The T/A did not fly 15,000+ combat missions - as stated in your articles about the demise of Col. Charles Dryden. They flew 15,000+ 

"sorties" To have flown that many "missions" during the time they were in combat in the MTO, they would have had to fly about 25 

missions a day everyday they were in combat. Do the math. That's one mission every hour, everyday they were in combat. Impossible! Weather 

alone would have prevented this, not to mention the problem of keeping all of their aircraft flyable everyday over that period of time. 


FACT: Their official records indicate they flew only 311 missions, a far cry from 15,000 claimed. Please advise your reporters of the 

difference between a mission and a sortie so that another T/A myth is not appearing in every mention this Fighter group. 



The Dryden story also stated that the 99th Squadron of the T/A was "the most successful squadron in American history." NOT SO! It would 

be more correct to say they have been the most publicized squadron in American history , however, thanks to a fully-paid public relations 

staff in Washington, D.C., the only such office of any military unit other than the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard.. 

Although I do not have complete combat statistics on all the fighter groups flying out of Africa and Italy (the MTO), I do have the stats 

on all of the 16 fighter groups flying in the Eighth Air Force over western Europe. And, when these records are compared, the Tuskegee 

Airmen rank at the bottom of the list despite the fact that they had  four squadrons to only three for the 8th AF groups. FYI, and one of 

the reasons the T/A exploit their 15,000+ sorties (which they call missions) is that on a normal mission they would put up 64 fighters 

compared to only 48 for the 8th AF groups . And, since they did mostly ground support missions rather than bomber escort missions , the 

average length of their missions was about half that of the time in the air flown by the 8thAF fighters. Re the above mentioned stats, I 

would be delighted to provide these for your information if requested. 

Another gross error in your first story on Colonel Dryden is that the implication that he was, individually, awarded the Congressional Gold 

Medal recently. ALSO NOT TRUE. Through the efforts of the New York Senator, this medal was awarded to the Tuskegee Airmen, authorizing 

all Tuskegee Airman to receive this award. It was not awarded for individual achievements, as implied, but for the role played by the T/ 

A in breaking the color ban for pilots, a civil rights accomplishment, not for their military achievements. 


Had this award been given for their military achievements alone, it should also have been awarded to each and every other fighter group 

in WWII whose records exceeded those of the Tuskegee Airmen. In my opinion, this was a "political award" instead of a military award. 

No other bomber or fighter units have been awarded this Medal, only Unit Citations. These are facts. Check them out, and here's to more 

factual reporting and a better AJC. 

Most sincerely, 

Robert H. Powell, Jr. 

Author/Editor/Historian/Pilot 

352nd Fighter Group 

1545 Rainier Falls Dr. 

Atlanta, GA 30329

-- 

Subject: Fw: Declassified Plans for WWll in Japan

A fascinating read on what would have happened if we had not had and used the 

atomic bombs on Japan .

Deep in the recesses of the National Archives in Washington , D.C. , hidden for 

nearly four decades lie thousands of pages of yellowing and dusty documents 

stamped "Top Secret". These documents, now declassified, are the plans for 

Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan during World War II.

Only a few Americans in 1945 were aware of the elaborate plans that had been 

prepared for the Allied Invasion of the Japanese home islands. Even fewer today 

are aware of the defenses the Japanese had prepared to counter the invasion had 

it been launched. Operation Downfall was finalized during the spring and summer 

of 1945. It called for two massive military undertakings to be carried out in 

succession and aimed at the heart of the Japanese Empire.

In the first invasion - code named "Operation Olympic"- American combat troops 

would land on Japan by amphibious assault during the early morning hours of 

November 1, 1945 - 61 years ago. Fourteen combat divisions of soldiers and 

Marines would land on heavily fortified and defended Kyushu , the southernmost 

of the Japanese home islands, after an unprecedented naval and aerial 

bombardment.

The second invasion on March 1, 1946 - code named "Operation Coronet"- would 

send at least 22 divisions against 1 million Japanese defenders on the main 

island of Honshu and the Tokyo Plain. It's goal: the unconditional surrender of 

Japan ..

With the exception of a part of the British Pacific Fleet, Operation Downfall 

was to be a strictly American operation. It called for using the entire Marine 

Corps, the entire Pacific Navy, elements of the 7th Army Air Force, the 8 Air 

Force (recently redeployed from Europe ), 10th Air Force and the American Far 

Eastern Air Force. More than 1.5 million combat soldiers, with 3 million more in 

support or more than 40% of all servicemen still in uniform in 1945 - would be 

directly involved in the two amphibious assaults. Casualties were expected to be 

extremely heavy.

Admiral William Leahy estimated that there would be more than 250,000 Americans 

killed or wounded on Kyushu alone. General Charles Willoughby, chief of 

intelligence for General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the 

Southwest Pacific, estimated American casualties would be one million men by the 

fall of 1946. Willoughby 's own intelligence staff considered this to be a 

conservative estimate.

During the summer of 1945, America had little time to prepare for such an 

endeavor, but top military leaders were in almost unanimous agreement that an 

invasion was necessary.

While naval blockade and strategic bombing of Japan was considered to be useful, 

General MacArthur, for instance, did not believe a blockade would bring about an 

unconditional surrender. The advocates for invasion agreed that while a naval 

blockade chokes, it does not kill; and though strategic bombing might destroy 

cities, it leaves whole armies intact.

So on May 25, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after extensive deliberation, 

issued to General MacArthur, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Army Air Force General 

Henry Arnold, the top secret directive to proceed with the invasion of Kyushu . 

The target date was after the typhoon season.

President Truman approved the plans for the invasions July 24. Two days later, 

the United Nations issued the Potsdam Proclamation, which called upon Japan to 

surrender unconditionally or face total destruction. Three days later, the 

Japanese governmental news agency broadcast to the world that Japan would ignore 

the proclamation and would refuse to surrender. During

this same period it was learned -- via monitoring Japanese radio broadcasts -- 

that Japan had closed all schools and mobilized its school children, was arming 

its civilian population and was fortifying caves and building underground 

defenses.

Operation Olympic called for a four pronged assault on Kyushu . Its purpose was 

to seize and control the southern one-third of that island and establish naval 

and air bases, to tighten the naval blockade of the home islands, to destroy 

units of the main Japanese army and to support the later invasion of the Tokyo 

Plain.

The preliminary invasion would begin October 27 when the 40th Infantry Division 

would land on a series of small islands west and southwest of Kyushu . At the 

same time, the 158th Regimental Combat Team would invade and occupy a small 

island 28 miles south of Kyushu . On these islands, seaplane bases would be 

established and radar would be set up to provide advance air warning for the 

invasion fleet, to serve as fighter direction centers for the carrier-based 

aircraft and to provide an emergency anchorage for the invasion fleet, should 

things not go well on the day of the invasion. As the invasion grew imminent, 

the massive firepower of the Navy - the Third and Fifth Fleets -- would approach 

Japan . The Third Fleet, under Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, with its big guns 

and naval aircraft, would provide strategic support for the operation against 

Honshu and Hokkaido  Halsey's fleet would be composed of battleships, heavy 

cruisers, destroyers, dozens of

>  support ships and three fa

st carrier task groups. From these carriers, hundreds of Navy fighters, dive 

bombers and torpedo planes would hit targets all over the island of Honshu . The 

3,000 ship Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond Spruance, would carry the invasion 

troops.

Several days before the invasion, the battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers 

would pour thousands of tons of high explosives into the target areas. They 

would not cease the bombardment until after the land forces had been launched. 

During the early morning hours of November 1, the invasion would begin. 

Thousands of soldiers and Marines would pour ashore on beaches all along the 

eastern, southeastern, southern and western coasts of Kyushu . Waves of

Helldivers, Dauntless dive bombers, Avengers, Corsairs, and Hellcats from 66 

aircraft carriers would bomb, rocket and strafe enemy defenses, gun emplacements 

and troop concentrations along the beaches.

The Eastern Assault Force consisting of the 25th, 33rd, and 41st Infantry 

Divisions, would land near Miyaski, at beaches called Austin, Buick, Cadillac, 

Chevrolet, Chrysler, and Ford, and move inland to attempt to capture the city 

and its nearby airfield. The Southern Assault Force, consisting of the 1st 

Cavalry Division, the 43rd Division and Americal Division would land inside 

Ariake Bay at beaches labeled DeSoto, Dusenberg, Essex, Ford, and Franklin and 

attempt to capture Shibushi and the city of Kanoya and its airfield.

On the western shore of Kyushu, at beaches Pontiac, Reo, Rolls Royce, Saxon, 

Star, Studebaker, Stutz, Winston and Zephyr, the V Amphibious Corps would land 

the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Marine Divisions, sending half of its force inland to 

Sendai and the other half to the port city of Kagoshima.

On November 4, the Reserve Force, consisting of the 81st and 98th Infantry 

Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division, after feigning an attack on the island 

of Shikoku, would be landed -- if not needed elsewhere – near Kaimondake, near 

the southernmost tip of Kagoshima Bay, at the beaches designated Locomobile, 

Lincoln, LaSalle, Hupmobile, Moon, Mercedes, Maxwell, Overland, Oldsmobile, 

Packard, and Plymouth.

Olympic was not just a plan for invasion, but for conquest and occupation as 

well. It was expected to take four months to achieve its objective, with the 

three fresh American divisions per month to be landed in support of that 

operation if needed. If all went well with Olympic, Coronet would be launched 

March 1, 1946. Coronet would be twice the size of Olympic, with as many as 28 

divisions landing on Honshu ..

All along the coast east of Tokyo , the American 1st Army would land the 5th, 

7th, 27th, 44th, 86th, and 96th Infantry Divisions, along with the 4th and 6th 

Marine Divisions.

At Sagami Bay , just south of Tokyo , the entire 8th and 10th Armies would 

strike north and east to clear the long western shore of Tokyo Bay and attempt 

to go as far as Yokohama . The assault troops landing south of Tokyo would be 

the 4th, 6th, 8th, 24th, 31st, 37th, 38th, and 8th Infantry

Divisions, along with the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions.

Following the initial assault, eight more divisions - the 2nd, 28th, 35th, 91st, 

95th, 97th, and 104th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Airborne Division -- would 

be landed. If additional troops were needed, as expected, other divisions 

redeployed from Europe and undergoing training in the 

United States would be shipped to Japan in what was hoped to be the final push.

Captured Japanese documents and post war interrogations of Japanese military 

leaders disclose that information concerning the number of Japanese planes 

available for the defense of the home islands was dangerously in error.

During the sea battle at Okinawa alone, Japanese Kamikaze aircraft sank 32 

Allied ships and damaged more than 400 others. But during the summer of 1945, 

American top brass concluded that the Japanese had spent their air force since 

American bombers and fighters daily flew unmolested over Japan .

What the military leaders did not know was that by the end of July the Japanese 

had been saving all aircraft, fuel, and pilots in reserve, and had been 

feverishly building new planes for the decisive battle for their homeland.

As part of Ketsu -Go, the name for the plan to defend Japan -- the Japanese were 

building 20 suicide takeoff strips in southern Kyushu with underground hangars. 

They also had 35 camouflaged airfields and nine seaplane bases.

On the night before the expected invasion, 50 Japanese seaplane bombers, 100 

former carrier aircraft and 50 land based army planes were to be launched in a 

suicide attack on the fleet.

The Japanese had 58 more airfields in Korea , western Honshu and Shikoku , which 

also were to be used for massive suicide attacks.

Allied intelligence had established that the Japanese had no more than 2,500 

aircraft of which they guessed 300 would be deployed in suicide attacks In 

August 1945, however, unknown to Allied intelligence, the Japanese still had 

5,651 army and 7,074 navy aircraft, for a total of 12,725 planes of all types. 

Every village had some type of aircraft manufacturing activity. Hidden in mines, 

railway tunnels, under viaducts and in basements of department stores, work was 

being done to construct new planes.

Additionally, the Japanese were building newer and more effective models of the 

Okka, a rocket-propelled bomb much like the German V-1, but flown by a suicide 

pilot.

When the invasion became imminent, Ketsu-Go called for a fourfold aerial plan of 

attack to destroy up to 800 Allied ships.

While Allied ships were approaching Japan , but still in the open seas, an 

initial force of 2,000 army and navy fighters were to fight to the death to 

control the skies over Kyushu . A second force of 330 navy combat pilots was to 

attack the main body of the task force to keep it from using its fire support 

and air cover to protect the troop carrying transports. While these two forces 

were engaged, a third force of 825 suicide planes was to hit the American 

transports.

As the invasion convoys approached their anchorages, another 2,000 suicide 

planes were to be launched in waves of 200 to 300, to be used in hour by hour 

attacks.

By mid-morning of the first day of the invasion, most of the American land-based 

aircraft would be forced to return to their bases, leaving the defense against 

the suicide planes to the carrier pilots and the shipboard gunners.

Carrier pilots crippled by fatigue would have to land time and time again to 

rearm and refuel. Guns would malfunction from the heat of continuous firing and 

ammunition would become scarce. Gun crews would be exhausted by nightfall, but 

still the waves of kamikaze would continue. With the fleet hovering off the 

beaches, all remaining Japanese aircraft would be committed to nonstop suicide 

attacks, which the Japanese hoped could be sustained for 10 days. The Japanese 

planned to coordinate their air strikes with attacks from the 40 remaining 

submarines from the Imperial Navy – some armed with Long Lance torpedoes with a 

range of 20 miles -- when the invasion fleet was 180 miles off Kyushu ..

The Imperial Navy had 23 destroyers and two cruisers which were operational. 

These ships were to be used to counterattack the American invasion. A number of 

the destroyers were to be beached at the last minute to be used as anti-invasion 

gun platforms.

Once offshore, the invasion fleet would be forced to defend not only against the 

attacks from the air, but would also be confronted with suicide attacks from 

sea. Japan had established a suicide naval attack unit of midget submarines, 

human torpedoes and exploding motorboats.

The goal of the Japanese was to shatter the invasion before the landing. The 

Japanese were convinced the Americans would back off or become so demoralized 

that they would then accept a less-than-unconditional surrender and a more 

honorable and face-saving end for the Japanese.

But as horrible as the battle of Japan would be off the beaches, it would be on 

Japanese soil that the American forces would face the most rugged and fanatical 

defense encountered during the war.

Throughout the island-hopping Pacific campaign, Allied troops had always out 

numbered the Japanese by 2 to 1 and sometimes 3 to 1. In Japan it would be 

different. By virtue of a combination of cunning, guesswork, and brilliant 

military reasoning, a number of Japan 's top military leaders were able to 

deduce, not only when, but where, the United States would land its first 

invasion forces

Facing the 14 American divisions landing at Kyushu would be 14 Japanese 

divisions, 7 independent mixed brigades, 3 tank brigades and thousands of naval 

troops. On Kyushu the odds would be 3 to 2 in favor of the Japanese, with 

790,000 enemy defenders against 550,000 Americans. This time the bulk of the 

Japanese defenders would not be the poorly trained and ill-equipped labor 

battalions that the Americans had faced in the earlier campaigns.

The Japanese defenders would be the hard core of the home army. These troops 

were well-fed and well equipped. They were familiar with the terrain, had 

stockpiles of arms and ammunition, and had developed an effective system of 

transportation and supply almost invisible from the air. Many of these Japanese 

troops were the elite of the army, and they were swollen with a fanatical

fighting spirit.

Japan 's network of beach defenses consisted of offshore mines, thousands of 

suicide scuba divers attacking landing craft, and mines planted on the beaches. 

Coming ashore, the American Eastern amphibious assault forces at Miyazaki would 

face three Japanese divisions, and two others poised for counterattack. Awaiting 

the Southeastern attack force at Ariake Bay was an

entire division and at least one mixed infantry brigade.

On the western shores of Kyushu , the Marines would face the most brutal 

opposition. Along the invasion be aches would be the three Japanese divisions, a 

tank brigade, a mixed infantry brigade and an artillery command. Components of 

two divisions would also be poised to launch counterattacks

If not needed to reinforce the primary landing beaches, the American Reserve 

Force would be landed at the base of Kagoshima Bay November 4, where they would 

be confronted by two mixed infantry brigades, parts of two infantry divisions 

and thousands of naval troops.

All along the invasion beaches, American troops would face coastal batteries, 

anti-landing obstacles and a network of heavily fortified pillboxes, bunkers, 

and underground fortresses. As Americans waded ashore, they would face intense 

artillery and mortar fire as they worked their way through concrete rubble and 

barbed-wire entanglements arranged to funnel them into the

muzzles of these Japanese guns.

On the beaches and beyond would be hundreds of Japanese machine gun positions, 

beach mines, booby traps, trip-wire mines and sniper units. Suicide units 

concealed in "spider holes" would engage the troops as they passed nearby In 

the heat of battle, Japanese infiltration units would be sent to reap havoc in 

the American lines by cutting phone and communication lines. Some of the 

Japanese troops would be in American uniform; English-speaking Japanese officers 

were assigned to break in on American radio traffic to call off artillery fire, 

to order retreats and to further confuse troops. Other infiltration with 

demolition charges strapped on their chests or backs would attempt to blow up 

American tanks, artillery pieces and ammunition stores as they were unloaded 

ashore.

Beyond the beaches were large artillery pieces situated to bring down a curtain 

of fire on the beach. Some of these large guns were mounted on railroad tracks 

running in and out of caves protected by concrete and steel.

The battle for Japan would be won by what Simon Bolivar Buckner, a lieutenant 

general in the Confederate army during the Civil War, had called "Prairie Dog 

Warfare." This type of fighting was almost unknown to the ground troops in 

Europe and the Mediterranean . It was peculiar only to the soldiers and Marines 

who fought the Japanese on islands all over the Pacific -- at Tarawa, Saipan, 

Iwo Jima and Okinawa .

Prairie Dog Warfare was a battle for yards, feet and sometimes inches. It was 

brutal, deadly and dangerous form of combat aimed at an underground, heavily 

fortified, non-retreating enemy.

In the mountains behind the Japanese beaches were underground networks of caves, 

bunkers, command posts and hospitals connected by miles of tunnels with dozens 

of entrances and exits. Some of these complexes could hold up to 1,000 troops.

In addition to the use of poison gas and bacteriological warfare (which the 

Japanese had experimented with), Japan mobilized its citizenry.

Had Olympic come about, the Japanese civilian population, inflamed by a national 

slogan - "One Hundred Million Will Die for the Emperor and Nation" - were 

prepared to fight to the death. Twenty Eight Million Japanese had become a part 

of the National Volunteer Combat Force. They were armed with ancient rifles, 

lunge mines, satchel charges, Molotov cocktails and one-shot black powder 

mortars. Others were armed with swords, long bows, axes and bamboo spears. The 

civilian units were to be used in nighttime attacks, hit and run maneuvers, 

delaying actions and massive suicide charges at the weaker American positions.

At the early stage of the invasion, 1,000 Japanese and American soldiers would 

be dying every hour.

The invasion of Japan never became a reality because on August 6, 1945, an 

atomic bomb was exploded over Hiroshima . Three days later, a second bomb was 

dropped on Nagasaki . Within days the war with Japan was at a close.

Had these bombs not been dropped and had the invasion been launched as 

scheduled, combat casualties in Japan would have been at a minimum of the tens 

of thousands. Every foot of Japanese soil would have been paid for by Japanese 

and American lives.

One can only guess at how many civilians would have committed suicide in their 

homes or in futile mass military attacks. In retrospect, the 1 million American 

men who were to be the casualties of the invasion were instead lucky enough to 

survive the war.

Intelligence studies and military estimates made 50 years ago, and not 

latter-day speculation, clearly indicate that the battle for Japan might well 

have resulted in the biggest blood-bath in the history of modern warfare.

Far worse would be what might have happened to Japan as a nation and as a 

culture. When the invasion came, it would have come after several months of fire 

bombing all of the remaining Japanese cities. The cost in human life that 

resulted from the two atomic blasts would be small in comparison to the total 

number of Japanese lives that would have been lost by this aerial

devastation.

With American forces locked in combat in the south of Japan , little could have 

prevented the Soviet Union from marching into the northern half of the Japanese 

home islands. Japan today could be divided much like Korea and Germany ..

The world was spared the cost of Operation Downfall, however, because Japan 

formally surrendered to the United Nations September 2, 1945, and World War II 

was over.

The aircraft carriers, cruisers and transport ships scheduled to carry the 

invasion troops to Japan , ferried home American troops in a gigantic operation 

called Magic Carpet.

In the fall of 1945, in the aftermath of the war, few people concerned 

themselves with the invasion plans. Following the surrender, the classified 

documents, maps, diagrams and appendices for Operation Downfall were packed away 

in boxes and eventually stored at the National Archives. These plans that called 

for the invasion of Japan paint a vivid description of what might have been one 

of the most horrible campaigns in the history of man. The fact that the story of 

the invasion of Japan is locked up in the National Archives and is not told in 

our history books is something for which all Americans can be thankful.

....................

I had the distinct privilege of being assigned as later commander of the 8090th 

PACUSA detach, 20th AAF, and one of the personal pilots of then Brig General 

Fred Irving USMA 17 when he was commanding general of Western Pacific Base 

Command. We had a brand new C-46F tail number 8546. It was different from the 

rest of the C-46 line in that it was equipped with Hamilton Hydromatic props 

whereas the others had Curtis electrics. On one of the many flights we had 14 

Generals and Admiral s aboard on an inspection trip to Saipan and Tinian . 

Notable aboard was General Thomas C. Handy, who had signed the operational order 

to drop the atomic bombs on Japan . President Truman's orders were verbal. He 

never signed an order to drop the bombs.

On this particular flight, about half way from Guam to Tinian , a full Colonel 

(General Handy's aide) came up forward and told me that General Handy would like 

to come up and look around. I told him, "Hell yes, he can fly the airplane if he 

wants to, sir".

He came up and sat in the copilot’s seat, put on the headset and we started 

chatting. I asked him if he ever regretted dropping the bombs. His answer was, 

"Certainly not. We saved a million lives on both sides by doing it. It was the 

right thing to do".

I never forgot that trip and the honor of being able to talk to General Handy. I 

was a Lt at the time. A postscript about General Irving; He was one of the 

finest gentleman I ever met He was the oldest living graduate of West Point 

when he passed on at 100+.

He was one of three Generals who had the honor of being both the "Supe" and 

"Com" of West Point . I think the other gentleman were BG Sladen, class of 1890 

and BG Stewart, Class of 1896.

I am very happy the invasion never came off because if it had I don't think I 

would be writing this today. We were to provide air support for the boots on the 

ground guys. The small arms fire would have been devastating and lethal as hell 

to fly through... Just think what it would have been like on the ground.....

But, C'est la vie. You do what needs to be done. You don't act like gutless 

wonders and carry peace signs around....